Burglary
Burglary is generally thought of as the typical situation
of someone breaking into a private home and stealing from it. In law, burglary
does cover this situation but it goes further.
The Law on Burglary is divided into two parts:
Section 9(1)(a) and Section 9(1)(b) of the Theft Act
1968.
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Section 9(1)(a) states that a person is guilty of
burglary if he enters any building or part of a building as a trespasser with
intention to steal or inflict Grievous Bodily Harm or do unlawful damage to the
building or anything in it.
This essentially means that the defendant has to be
a trespasser on private property uninvited. In the Section 9(1)(a) there must
be ‘Intent’ to steal property this is specific intention to steal or cause harm
or unlawful damage.
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Section 9(1)(b) states that a person is guilty of
burglary if having entered as a trespasser and steals unintentionally or
attempts to steal anything in the building or possibly inflicts or attempts to
inflict GBH on any person in the building without specific intention of doing
so.
This essentially means that you have to be a
trespasser on private property uninvited. Section 9(1)(b) outlines a different
intention of ‘Attempt’ or ‘Attempted’ to steal, meaning without specific
intention to steal also meaning that there is no specific intention to cause or
inflict GBH or unlawful damage to anyone or anything in the building.
Background and Sentencing
Given that burglary is quite an intrusive offence
there is a difference in maximum sentences if there is a threat to a home.
There is no higher maximum sentence if the property burgled was a dwelling
meaning a home or house and therefore technically Section 9 creates four
offences.
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Section 9(1)(a) of a dwelling
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Section 9(1)(a) of a non-dwelling
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Section 9(1)(b)of a dwelling
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Section 9(1)(b) of a non-dwelling
Within both Section 9(1)(a) and Section 9 (1)(b)
there are a number of common elements specifically in Actus Reus –
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Entry
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Of a Building
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As a trespasser
And in Mens Rea –
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Knowledge or recklessness as to entering as a
trespasser.
However there are individual features of the
offences which will make them quite distinct.
The offences of 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(b) will therefore
be considered in turn.
The Actus Reus of Section 9(1)(a) has three elements –
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Entered
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A building or part of a building
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As a trespasser
The Mens Rea has two elements –
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Intention or recklessness to entre as a trespasser
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Intention to commit the ulterior offence
The defendant must know or be subjectively reckless
as to whether he is trespassing.
Burglary under Section 9 (1)(b)
The Actus Reus of Section 9(1)(b) has four elements
–
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Entered
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A building or part of a building
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As a trespasser
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Actus Reus of Theft or GBH
The Mens Rea has two elements –
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Intention or recklessness to entre as a trespasser
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Intention to commit the ulterior offence
Entry
The defendant must entre, or has entered a building
in order to be guilty of burglary. Weather there has been an entry is s
question of fact for the jury. In giving them guidance, the Court of Appeal has
held that there has to be an ‘effective’ entry. This essentially means that
there must have been enough of the defendant in the building to achieve the
ulterior intention like committing or attempting to commit one of the ulterior
offences.
A case to support this is R v Collins 1972 where the
court decided that the defendant had made an effective entry.
The Victim a woman following an evening of drinking
went to bed, the defendant had gone to her house, taken off his clothes and
climbed a ladder in order to enter her bedroom and have intimacy with her. The
defendant claimed that whilst balancing on the window sill the girl had invited
him in assuming he was her boyfriend. However during the intimacy she realised
he was not her boyfriend and she demanded him to leave.
His convictions where quashed for burglary as a
trespasser as the jury must be satisfied that the defendant had made an
effective and substantial entry into the building. Meaning he was found not
guilty.
However a Guilty case is R v Brown 1985 – where the
defendant was convicted because he had made an ‘effective’ entry because he
could handle enough of the goods inside the shop window to commit the ulterior
offence.
The defendant was arrested whilst standing on the
pavement outside a shop, with the upper body and arms through a broken window
as he was rummaging through the goods inside.
His convictions for burglary were upheld by the
Court of Appeal who said this was a ‘sufficient entry’ as long as the ulterior
intent was present.
R v Ryan outlines the principle that there is no
requirement for a successful theft under Section 9(1)(a) is illustrated.
The defendant was found trapped in a window frame,
with his head and one arm inside the house and the rest of him outside. His
appeal against his conviction for burglary was dismissed even though he could
not in fact steal anything because of being stuck, his entry was sufficient.
The place which the defendant enters as a trespasser
must be a building or a part of a building. Under the act there is no formal
definition of a building, but section 9 (3) states that it must be a fairly
permanent fixed structure or a substantial portable structure that is designed
to be lived in, for example it includes inhabited vehicles or vessels e.g.
caravans and house boats.
Section 9 (3) states – References in subsection 1
and 2 above to a building shall also apply to an inhabited vehicle or vessel,
and shall apply to any such vehicle or vessel at times when the person having
habitation in it is not there as well as times where he is.
A case to support this is – B and S v Leathley 1979
– where a 25 foot long freezer container had been in a farmyard for over two
years and was used as a storage facility. It rested on Sleepers and had doors
with locks and was connected to the electricity supply. It was held to be a
building. However Stevens v Gourley 1859 – where a building is defined as a
structure of considerable size and intended to be permanent or at least to
endure for a considerable time. However in contradiction to this is that it could
not be generalised to more relative cases closer to the current date period as
in the case of Norfolk Constabulary v Seekings and Gould 1986 – where a lorry
trailer with wheels which had been used for storage for over a year and had
steps providing access and was connected to an electricity supply was held not
to be a building, it in fact had wheels meaning that it was a vehicle which
contradicted the definition in Stevens v Gourley.
Trespass
This occurs when a person intentionally or
recklessly enters a building in the possession of another without permission or
legal right or does so. This essentially means that entry has to be voluntary,
not forced or purely accidental.
Usually it will be easy to show that the wrongdoer
is trespassing but occasionally there are problems, as, for example when the
defendant claims he has a right to be there for the offence of burglary to be
made out there must be a finding of civil trespass. However the Court of Appeal
has held that a defendant charged with burglary must have Mens Rea to whether or not he
is trespassing. That is, d must enter ‘knowing that he is a trespasser or, at
the very least is reckless whether or not he is entering the premises of
another without the other party’s consent’.
As in the case of R v Collins 1973 –
The defendant went past a house where he knew a
young lady lived. He climbed a ladder up to her window and peered in. She was
lying naked on the bed, which was near the window. Collins descended the
ladder, took off all his clothes, except his socks, and climbed back up the
ladder. As he reached the window, the young lady woke up saw a naked man with
an erect penis and, thinking he was her boyfriend invited him in; they then had
sexual intercourse. She then realised that it was not her boyfriend.
It was held: In order to be convicted of
burglary, the defendant had to have made a substantial and effective entry as a
trespasser before consent was given. Meaning he was not guilty.
The jury had not been asked to consider the vital
question whether he had entered the building as a trespasser and whether he
knew or was reckless as to whether he was entering as a trespasser. It was accepted
that an invitation from the young lady would have been sufficient to make
Collins’s entry not trespasser and so consideration should have been given to
when her invitation was made, that is, whether he was outside the building at
that time or not. Presumably someone could override such permission with a
greater interest in the building in question.
The court expressed its view on Mens Rea as follows
“there cannot be a conviction for entering premises
‘as a trespasser’ … unless the person entering does so knowing that he is a
trespasser and nevertheless deliberately enters, or, at the very least, is
reckless as to whether or not he is entering the premises of another without
the other party’s consent"
Edmund Davies LJ:
"A serious offence
like burglary should require Mens Rea in the fullest sense of the phrase: D
should be liable for burglary only if he knowingly trespasses or is reckless as
to whether he trespasses or not"
Permission to enter a building or part of a building
can be given expressly or impliedly from the circumstances. For example, at college, you have implied
permission to enter the common areas of the building, and other areas only with
permission e.g. emergency stairwells etc.
A sign on an office door saying “meeting in progress” means do not
enter. Any student who has been
suspended or excluded from college does not have permission to be on site and
therefore would be classed as a trespasser.
A person who is given permission to enter for one
purpose but in fact enters for another purpose is entering as a
trespasser. For example in the case of
R v Jones and Smith 1976 –
The defendant had stolen two televisions from his
father's house, which he had general permission to enter. He had left home but
was allowed to visit. It was held that the defendant was a trespasser if
he entered premises knowing that or being reckless whether he was entering in
excess of any permission that had been given to him to enter. He was found to
be Guilty.
The underlying principle is that if a person enters
a building with intent to steal, cause GBH or cause criminal damage, he does so
as a trespasser except in the unlikely event of the occupier giving him
permission to do so.
Coincidence in time
The defendant must be a trespasser at the time of
entry into the building or part of the building as in the case of R v Laing 1995 –
The defendant hid himself in the stock area of a
department store. When the store had closed he was discovered. There was
no evidence that he was a trespasser when he entered the store. It was held the prosecution should have
alleged he was a trespasser when entering the stock room. He was found to be not
guilty.
The
Actus Reus of s9(1)(b)
The prosecution must prove all the elements of the Actus Reus of s9 (1)(a) offence and
in addition prove that the Actus Reus
of the ulterior offence, such as stealing, attempting to steal, inflicting or
attempting to inflict GBH has been carried out. This offence is committed not
at the time of entry but at the time of committing the ulterior offence.
The Mens Rea of 9(1)(a)
There are 2 elements: intention or recklessness as
to the trespass, and intention to commit the ulterior offence.
1)
Intention or recklessness as to the trespass.
In civil law there is no need for Mens Rea to be proved in relation to
a civil trespass, but in criminal law it is necessary in the context of
burglary. The relevant form of Mens Rea
is intention or subjective recklessness. In the case of Collins the defendant
probably lacked intention or recklessness to trespass if he enters the house
after the girl had invited him in.
2)
Intention to commit the ulterior offence
The defendant must intend to commit one of the
offences listed in Section 9(2), known as the ulterior offences: theft;
inflicting GBH; unlawful damage to the building or anything in it. The
intention must exist at the time of entry. Provided the defendant enters with
the relevant intention, the full offence of burglary is committed at the point
of entry; the defendant need not actually proceed to commit the ulterior
offence.
Conditional Intent
Conditional intention is not enough for theft.
However for burglary conditional intent can be sufficient, so if for e.g. a
defendant breaks into a house intending to steal if they find anything worth taking,
or to commit GBH to a particular person if that person is in the house, then
that intention may be sufficient for burglary.
A case to support this is
R v Walkington (1979) –
The defendant went behind a counter in a large store
and opened a till drawer. The counter was movable, but occupied a clearly
identified area. It was empty so he slammed it shut. The defendant was
convicted for burglary. The defendant claimed he did not realise that he
was not allowed to go behind the counter and therefore had not entered as a
trespasser. It was held that it is for the jury to decide whether the
area physically marked out by a counter was sufficiently segregated to amount
to a "part of a building" from which the general public are excluded.
It was clear that the public was impliedly prohibited from entering the counter
area and the defendant knew this. He was found Guilty even though
nothing in the till.
Or in the case of Attorney-Generals References
Nos 1+2 of 1979 –
The defendant 2 was caught inside a house. The
defendant no 1 found attempting to burgle a house through French windows he
admitted he intended to steal “anything lying around”. Both acquitted by
the trial judge because it had not been specified by the prosecution what items
they intended to steal. It was held that Conditional intent will suffice;
meaning quite simply that all that is required is intent to steal at the time
of entry. It is not necessary to prove what was the objected that D intended to
steal.
If it subsequently turns out that there is nothing
worth stealing in the building, the defendant still may be prosecuted for
burglary.
Similar considerations apply where the charge relates to attempted burglary. They were found to not be guilty, but would be now.
Similar considerations apply where the charge relates to attempted burglary. They were found to not be guilty, but would be now.
Aggravated burglary
This is defined in the Theft Act 1968, s10 as:
‘A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if he
commits any burglary and at the time has with him any firearm or imitation
firearm, any weapon of offence, or any explosive’
This means any article made or adapted for use for
causing injury to or incapacitating a person, or intended by the person having
it with him for such use.
Articles made for incapacitating a person might
include a pair of handcuffs, articles adapted for incapacitating include a pair
of socks made into a gag, and articles intended might include sleeping pills to
put in someone’s tea, a rope to tie someone up, pepper to throw in someone’s
face etc.
This means any article manufactured for the purpose
of producing a practical effect by explosion, or intended by the person having
it with him for that purpose.
A box of matches would not be an explosive under the
Theft Act.
Actus Reus
Aggravated burglary involves committing a burglary
when equipped with a weapon. The defendant must be in possession of the weapon
at the time of the burglary. NB The moment at which the burglary occurs depends
on whether it is s9(1)(a) or s9(1)(b).
A case to support this is R v O'Leary 1986
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The defendant entered a house without a weapon. Once inside he took a knife from the kitchen and took it upstairs to affect the burglary. It was held that the offence was charged under Section 9(1)(b) and there was thus no requirement that he had the knife at the time of entry. His conviction was upheld.
The defendant entered a house without a weapon. Once inside he took a knife from the kitchen and took it upstairs to affect the burglary. It was held that the offence was charged under Section 9(1)(b) and there was thus no requirement that he had the knife at the time of entry. His conviction was upheld.
Whether the defendant arms himself only to escape,
having already completed the burglary e.g. by stealing, being guilty of the
aggravated offence is debatable. By analogy with the courts approach in Watson
(1989) and the courts’ willingness to treat theft act offences as continuing it
is likely that the offence would be held to have been committed.
R
v Watson 1989 set out –
The appellant smashed a window and broke into the
house of an 87 year old man, Harold Moyler. Moyler went to investigate and the
appellant shouted abuse at him and ran off. The police arrived and Moyler
suffered a heart attack and died 90 minutes after the initial break in. it was
held that his conviction was quashed as it could not be established that the
break in was the cause of the heart attack. However, the Court of Appeal held
that a sober and reasonable person would regard the act of the appellant as
dangerous as they would have known of the age and frail condition of the
victim.
Mens Rea
The defendant must have the Mens Rea of burglary and also know that he or she has the
weapon.
The expression ‘has with him’ appears in the
Prevention of Crime Act 1953 and reference should be made to discussion of that
Act, particularly as regards the controversial issues of the defendant claiming
to have forgotten that he ‘has with him’ the forbidden article.
It was held that a common sense approach to this
question should be taken as in the case of R v Bradish 2004 –
In the circumstances of the
instant case, where the defendants were armed with firearms whilst intending to
commit a robbery, an offence of having a firearm with intent to commit an indictable
offence, contrary to Section 18 of the in relation to a third firearm, which
had been left at an associates flat at least two miles from the scene, had not
been made out. Essentially meaning the firearm could not be said to be with that defendant for the purposes of
the Firearms Act 1968 Section 18.
When the prosecution have
proved that the article was made or adapted for causing injury or incapacitating,
they need not prove that the defendant intended to use the weapon in the course
of burglary. Where the article was not so made or adapted, but the prosecution
proved the defendant had it with him for such use it is not necessary to show
that he intended so to use it in the course of the burglary.
As in the case of R v
Stones 1989 –
The defendant was caught
by the police during the course of committing a burglary. He had a knife on him
at the time and was charged and convicted of aggravated burglary. He appealed
contending that he had no intention to use the knife in the burglary and was
only carrying it as the lads from Blyth were after him. It was held that the Conviction
be upheld. Possession of the weapon at the time of the burglary is all that is
required for aggravated burglary. There is no Mens Rea required as to the
possession. He was found guilty Therefore, conditional
intent to use a weapon suffices for the offence.
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